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[Excerpt] Macro financial risk propagation and its implications on financial stability have emerged as 
major concerns of governments and financial institutions, particularly those with large financial asset 
pools. The global financial crisis in 2008–2009 was essentially centered on credit risk involving money 
markets, and the propagation of such risk across and among financial institutions and sovereigns is 
related to how connected they are. 
To understand the concept of connectedness, Merton provides a brief review of the concepts of credit, 
credit risk, and guarantees. He asserts that risk- free credit is essentially risky credit coupled with a 
guarantee of payment in the event of a default. That is, risky debt is nothing but risk-free debt less a 
guarantee of repayment. We note that in complete contingent markets, the holder of debt always has the 
option to purchase insurance on the debt, pretty much like the credit default swaps that are available in 
advanced financial markets today. The guarantee could be issued by a financial institution or a sovereign 
government, and effectively transfers the risk of default from the borrower to the guarantor. From the 
perspective of the lending institution, however, the instrument or asset it is holding is now essentially risk-
free debt. Merton stresses that the guarantees attached to risky debt are in fact insurance on the risk of 
default, and are akin to put options on assets of borrowers, with maturities similar to those of the debt 
instrument being guaranteed and a strike price equivalent to the promised payment of debt. 
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ADB’s Distinguished Speakers Program 
Measuring the Connectedness of 
the Financial System: Implications 
for Risk Management*1
Robert C. Merton
1997 Nobel Prize Winner
Macro financial risk propagation and its implications on financial stability have 
emerged as major concerns of governments and financial institutions, particularly 
those with large financial asset pools. The global financial crisis in 2008–2009 was 
essentially centered on credit risk involving money markets, and the propagation of 
such risk across and among financial institutions and sovereigns is related to how 
connected they are.
To understand the concept of connectedness, Merton provides a brief 
review of the concepts of credit, credit risk, and guarantees. He asserts that risk-
free credit is essentially risky credit coupled with a guarantee of payment in the 
event of a default. That is, risky debt is nothing but risk-free debt less a guarantee 
of repayment. We note that in complete contingent markets, the holder of debt 
always has the option to purchase insurance on the debt, pretty much like the 
credit default swaps that are available in advanced financial markets today. The 
guarantee could be issued by a financial institution or a sovereign government, and 
effectively transfers the risk of default from the borrower to the guarantor. From the 
perspective of the lending institution, however, the instrument or asset it is holding 
is now essentially risk-free debt. Merton stresses that the guarantees attached to 
risky debt are in fact insurance on the risk of default, and are akin to put options on 
assets of borrowers, with maturities similar to those of the debt instrument being 
guaranteed and a strike price equivalent to the promised payment of debt. 
*1 Robert C. Merton. 2014. Measuring the Connectedness of the Financial System: Implications 
for Risk Management. Asian Development Review 31(1): 186–210. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
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Measuring the Connectedness of the Financial System: Implications for Risk Management
(continued from page 1)
It is a common practice in all debt contracts for 
lenders to seize the assets of borrowers should the latter 
default on his or her debt obligations. The recovery value 
of the seized assets is typically less than the total value 
of outstanding debt at the time of default, and the value 
of the guarantee is the difference between the amount of 
outstanding debt minus the recovery value of the seized 
assets. The pay-off from the debt guarantee is therefore 
similar to that of a put option: Pay-off = max (0, B-A), 
where B is the outstanding value of the debt being 
guaranteed, and A is the recovery value of the defaulting 
borrower’s assets. 
The relationship between the value of the 
underlying asset of the borrower and the guarantee is 
depicted in Figure 1. The two charts at the bottom place 
the value of the guarantee on the vertical axis, and the 
value of borrowers’ assets on the horizontal axis. 
(continued on next page)
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Figure 1   Non-Linear Macro Risk Build-up
Source:  Merton (2014).
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Measuring the Connectedness of the Financial System: Implications for Risk Management
(continued from page 2)
The shapes of the curves in Figure 1 are no one’s 
particular theory, but holds in general. The concavity of 
the chart on top relating the value of debt to a borrower’s 
assets is related to the convexity of the bottom charts 
relating the value of guarantee to assets of the borrower. 
Merton stresses that, “all the action in the debt valuation 
comes from the put option component,” which is 
essentially the guarantee attached to its debt. The plots 
for the guarantee against assets of the borrower are 
downward sloping and convex. 
Everything that is known about put options can 
be used to value credit. For example, the value of a put 
option goes up when the volatility of an underlying asset 
increases, even if the value of the asset does not change. 
This will also hold for guarantees attached to credit—
increased riskiness of the credit increases the value of the 
guarantee. 
The convexity of the guarantee relative to asset 
values implies that the incremental unit declines as the 
value of assets raises the value of guarantees in a non-
linear fashion since the slope of the curve gets steeper. 
In the case of bank borrowings, for example, the rate of 
change of guarantees is steeper when the asset value is at 
A’c than at Ac. What would this mean for a bank? If asset 
values of the bank’s borrowers fall, then the riskiness 
of the bank’s debt goes up, and the guarantees on 
borrowers’ assets goes up as well. What happens to the 
bank’s capital then? It will fall as well, and the riskiness 
of the bank goes up because it becomes more leveraged. 
All banks must therefore ask themselves how by doing 
this loan and as a result of writing this guarantee, to what 
extent it is exposed to the risk associated with the assets 
that support the debt.
(continued on next page)
Banks borrow from each other, and also have 
guarantees written against their respective asset 
holdings, but what about the role of the sovereign? 
Sovereigns almost always guarantee their banks, either 
explicitly or implicitly. What is its liability? When a 
sovereign guarantees its banks, it is writing a put option 
on its banks’ assets. These bank assets are composed of 
bank loans to the private sector, which may be regarded 
as a combination of risk-free lending and a guarantee on 
the assets of its borrowers. Hence, if one pierces through 
the layers of credit and guarantees, the government is 
actually guaranteeing the guarantees of its banks – the 
sovereign is holding a put option on a put option, making 
it doubly convex and more sensitive to changes in the 
value of private sector assets. 
Note also that when the sovereign issues bonds, it is 
borrowing from the private sector. Since sovereign bonds 
are also held by banks that are being guaranteed by the 
sovereign, we now have a case of guarantors writing 
guarantees of their own guarantors.
The connectedness between banks and sovereigns 
is a potent propagation channel of macro financial 
risk. To measure connectedness, Merton and his co-
researchers used monthly credit data and estimated 
Granger-causality equations of put option price to 
risk free debt price ratios of a large sample of financial 
institutions and sovereigns over January 2001–March 
2012. Significant parameters of the estimated Granger 
equations are then interpreted as a directional impact 
of one institution to another institution or a sovereign. 
Using network mapping software, the extent of 
connectedness of institutions and sovereigns from July 
2004 to June 2007 is shown in Figure 2.
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Measuring the Connectedness of the Financial System: Implications for Risk Management
(continued from page 3)
The red lines are connections from banks, the blue 
lines are connections from insurance companies, and the 
black lines are from sovereigns. What are plotted are only 
the statistically significant, “average” connections that 
prevailed from July 2004 to June 2007. Note the extent 
of clustering and density of the lines in the period prior to 
the global financial crisis. A similar estimation procedure 
is employed for the period covering April 2009 top 
March 2012, which is then plotted in Figure 3.
There are more significant connections between 
banks, sovereigns and insurance companies after the 
global financial crisis. Since each line represents how 
Figure 2  Connectedness between Sovereigns, Banks and Insurance Companies, July 2004-June 2007
Source:   Billio et al. (2012).
one institution’s or sovereign’s put option price affects 
the put option price of another , the above implies 
connectedness and increased channels of macro 
financial risk propagation.
As a final exercise, the centrality of the estimated 
parameters is also calculated, such that the degree of 
connectedness between each pair of entities can be 
spatially mapped and clusters of closely connected 
institutions and sovereigns can be easily seen. In this 
manner, financial institutions that are systemically 
important will appear in center of risk clusters.
(continued on next page)
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Measuring the Connectedness of the Financial System: Implications for Risk Management
(continued from page 4)
Figure 3  Connectedness between Sovereigns, Banks and Insurance Companies, April 2009-March 2012
Source:   Billio et al. (2012).
Merton stresses that the above could be useful in 
dynamically tracking the evolution of macro financial 
risk, and could be useful tools in the conduct of risk 
management.
References
Billio, Monica, Mila Getmansky, Dale Gray, Andrew 
Lo, and Robert Merton. 2012. Sovereign, Bank 
and Insurance Credit Spreads: Connectedness 
and System Networks. Presented at the G-20 
Conference on Financial Systemic Risk. 27 
September, Istanbul, Turkey.
Merton, Robert C., 2014. Measuring the Connectedness 
of the Financial System: Implications for Risk 
Management. Asian Development Review 31(1): 
186–210. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
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Yen’s Trade Spillover
Benno Ferrarini 
There is no escaping Japan’s competition in the global 
markets for goods, particularly in the automotive and 
electronics industries. Countries exporting substitutable 
products to these markets are bound to feel the 
competitive pressure from a drop in the value of the 
yen. However, while some exporters may be hurt by a 
cheaper yen, others will benefit from lower input costs, to 
the extent that they source parts and components from 
Japan for processing, assembly and re-export. 
A recent paper (Ferrarini 2013a or b) formalizes 
these intuitions and tests them against a data set 
covering more than 90% of world trade at the product 
level, between 2000 and 2011. The analysis uses a 
finely detailed global trade matrix and a suitably defined 
index to identify and rank the key products, destinations 
and exporters facing Japan’s competition in global 
merchandise trade. For example, competition is assessed 
in terms of the Republic of Korea’s contention of Japan’s 
export share in the Chinese markets for imported 
photographic paper and related chemicals. Similarly 
assessed are each combination of the 1,215 product 
categories, 117 exporters and 53 importing countries 
included in the analysis, covering more than 90% of 
world trade.
The US and Europe compete intensely with 
Japan in the world merchandise markets (Figure 1). 
Germany ranks as the strongest challenger of Japan’s 
products across markets and is thus associated with 
a cumulative competitiveness index equal to 100, its 
normalized maximum. Several developing member 
countries (DMCs) are among the top group of countries 
competing with Japan, namely People’s Republic of 
China (PRC); the Republic of Korea; India; Hong Kong, 
China; Thailand; Singapore; Malaysia; and Indonesia. 
Other DMCs are less exposed to Japanese exports, such 
FEATURES
* Benno Ferrarini is senior economist at the Economics and Research Department at Asian Development Bank.
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Figure 1  Top Exporters Competing with Japan
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Figure 2  Other DMCs Competing with Japan
as the Philippines and Viet Nam, or virtually not at all, 
such as the Pacific island economies (Figure 2). DMCs 
also represent most of the destinations which Japan 
competes most fiercely for, foremost the PRC, followed 
by the Republic of Korea; Thailand; and Hong Kong, 
China (Figure 3).  
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Motor vehicles and related parts and accessories 
are products with the strongest competition between 
Japan and other exporters, followed by instruments, 
machinery, electrical and electronic components. Japan’s 
main competitors are thus economies with a strong 
foothold in the automotive or electronics industries, 
such as Germany, the United States, and the Republic of 
Korea.
To measure the yen’s impact in terms of 
competition with Japan, the competitiveness index by 
exporter–importer country-pairs and products is merged 
with data on yearly average exchange rates of the yen 
against the currencies of the economies Japan and its 
competitors export to. For example, one such exchange 
rate is the yen to the renminbi vis-à-vis the won, to 
determine the impact of exchange rate movements on 
the Republic of Korea’s exports. The ensuing data set 
spans over nearly 10 million observations. It is suitable 
for the application of a fixed-effect panel estimation 
technique involving more than one million indicator 
variables, in an attempt to avoid estimation bias from 
the likely presence of endogeneity, or indeterminacy 
as regards the causal relationship between exports and 
exchange rates.
Regression analysis yields robust evidence of the 
yen exchange rates impacting global trade flows. This 
finding is consistent and statistically significant across 
various model specifications. However, the estimated 
magnitude of the yen’s impact on trade suggests that 
while this matters for countries and market segments 
facing Japan’s strongest competition, it does less so for 
the bulk of world trade. That is, for the top 5% competing 
products and destinations serviced by both Japanese and 
competing exporters, a 10% depreciation (appreciation) 
of the yen against the local currency at destination 
lowers (raises) competing export flows by about 3.2% 
on average. For the remaining 95% of observations in the 
data set, the relationship is statistically irrefutable but 
practically irrelevant.
The regressions also confirm that a depreciation 
of the yen works to the advantage of countries that 
import, assemble and re-export Japanese parts and 
components. Indeed, when vertical trade is accounted 
for in the regressions, the net effect of a change in the 
value of the yen turns out to be negligible on average, 
because competition in the final goods markets and 
complementarity through trade in intermediates roughly 
cancel each other out.
Notwithstanding a strong impact for certain 
industries and products competing with Japan in certain 
markets, the findings in this paper suggest that the recent 
depreciation of the yen does not pose a particular threat 
to the economies in the region. Of greater importance for 
developing Asia will be Japan’s capacity to revitalize its 
economy, in the context of which the yen’s depreciation 
ought to be considered as a temporary symptom and not 
necessarily an indication of success.
References
Ferrarini, Benno. 2013a. Abenomics’ Trade Spillover. ADB 
Economics Working Paper Series 379. Manila: Asian 
Development Bank 
————. 2013b. Yen’s Trade Spillover. [the Republic of]
Korea and the World Economy 14(3): 555–579.
Yen’s Trade Spillover
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Figure 3  Top Destinations Japan Competes In
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Invisible Trade Barriers: Trade Effects of US 
Antidumping Actions against the People’s 
Republic of China
Minsoo Lee*
In the modern world economy, the increase in 
productivity in one country usually undermines other 
countries’ overall welfare. International trade is not likely 
to promote the welfare of all trading nations, but rather 
cause the conflict of interest among the trading partners 
(Gomory and Baumol 2000). The trade policy in one 
country is inevitably designed to protect its domestic 
industries. The wave of trade protectionism has never 
been fully dissipated in the past decades; however, the 
means of trade protection are becoming apparently 
subtle and diversified. 
In recent years, invisible trade barriers have been 
frequently implemented to protect specific industries in 
the local economy. There are three different categories 
of invisible barriers: antidumping, technical barriers, and 
environmental barriers. Antidumping refers to measures 
taken by one country against the dumping of products 
from foreign countries or regions in its domestic market. 
Based on the Antidumping Agreement covered by the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), dumping is defined 
by three significant characteristics: (i) dumping should 
be the behavior of selling products at the price less than 
the normal value of these products; (ii) this behavior 
brings substantial harm or threat of substantial damage 
to the relevant industries in the importing countries; 
and (iii) the low-cost sales and damage to the industries 
should have a causal relationship. 
In principle, the use of antidumping measures 
should be limited to instances where a trade partner 
is engaging in dumping; nevertheless, it is regarded 
as a new and effective form of trade protectionism. 
Aggarwal (2004) shares the view that antidumping is a 
protectionist tool and is not directly related to unfair trade 
practices of foreign companies. Antidumping measures, if 
incorrectly applied, becomes a major obstacle to free and 
fair trading relations (Prusa 2005). The United States 
(US) antidumping law, for example, was intended to 
prevent foreign companies from selling goods at unfair 
prices in the US domestic market and ensure the fairness 
of competition; notwithstanding, the antidumping 
law has become an excuse to shield some special 
interest groups at the expense of consumers and other 
businesses (Mankiw and Swagel 2005). The US seldom 
initiates investigations against the main importers of 
US products or those who adopt and use antidumping 
measures actively. On the contrary, lower US export 
penetration in a particular country and a weaker capacity 
to take retaliatory antidumping actions, increases the 
likelihood of a US antidumping action (Blonigen and 
Bown 2003). Over the past decade, there has been 
an increase in antidumping cases against the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) filed in the US. The asymmetry 
of capabilities to use antidumping measures between the 
US and the PRC might be contributory to a fair amount 
of US antidumping cases against the PRC.
The trade impacts of antidumping include (i) the 
investigation effect; (ii) the trade restriction effect; and 
(iii) the trade diversion effect. Antidumping investigation 
and measure generally have significant restrictive impact 
(continued on next page)
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on the trade from the targeted country (the trade 
restriction effect); however, trade can be diverted to 
other countries as a result of the antidumping action (the 
diversion effect). The overall effect is uncertain since 
the direction of the change of domestic products’ market 
share depends on the total change in imports from both 
the targeted country and non-targeted countries. If the 
magnitude of diversion of imports from the targeted 
country to non-targeted countries completely offsets any 
protective effect, antidumping measures are ineffective.
Investigation effect and trade restriction effect
During antidumping investigations, the trends of the US 
imports from the PRC have already been affected. Such 
effects are most apparent for high duty cases, consistent 
with Staiger and Wolak (1994), and Prusa (1996). Since 
there is an expected imposition of antidumping duties, 
exporters in the PRC face an incentive to reduce their 
exports to the US and increase the price to avoid the 
punitive duties. It is clear from Figure 1 that the year 
t-1 is an inflection point on the trend in US imports 
from the PRC. After the year t-1, the import quantity 
from the PRC begins to decline sharply. This decline 
is sustained beyond to the year t0 that the preliminary 
decision is made, and continued up to the year t+1, the 
Invisible Trade Barriers: Trade Effects of US Antidumping Actions against the 
People’s Republic of China
(continued from page 8)
year after antidumping measures are imposed. However, 
the restriction effect is quite short lived and feeble, 
with the trend in import volumes from the PRC seeing a 
reversal in year t+2 despite the continued imposition of 
antidumping duties. 
Trade Diversion Effects
Although US antidumping actions restrict US imports 
from the PRC, they can lead to increases of US imports 
from other countries which are not targeted in the 
imposed antidumping measures. These largely offset 
the trade remedy effects and the overall impact of 
antidumping measures becomes insignificant on the total 
imports by the US. The trade diversion effect occurs 
even before antidumping duties are imposed. Figure 2, 
for example, shows the trend in the volume of US imports 
from non-targeted countries. When duties are levied at 
t+1, the quantity of imports from non-targeted countries 
substantially increased. The impact of the antidumping 
investigation is more obvious for the rejected cases. In 
year t-1, the investigation year, the quantity and value of 
imports from non-targeted countries grew significantly. 
However, after the antidumping measures are imposed, 
the imports fall back to, or less than, their level in year t-2. 
(continued on next page)
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Figure 1  Duties Levied (Low-Duty Cases)
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Figure 2  Quantity of US Imports from Other Countries (5 years)
Source: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm
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Terms-of-Trade Effects
In another aspect, antidumping measures do achieve 
some purpose: They effectively increase the prices 
of products affected by the antidumping measures, 
especially those of imports from the PRC, which could 
also induce price increases from exporters from non-
targeted countries (see Figure 3). The imposition of 
antidumping measures, in other words, has effects that 
surpass what is intended by policymakers, end up raising 
the overall import price and negatively affecting US 
consumers. If the US consumers’ loss dominates the US 
producers’ benefit, the antidumping measures turn out 
to be inefficient. 
Other factors could significantly affect the 
impact of antidumping measures, such as the level of 
antidumping duty, the PRC’s position in domestic US 
markets, and the importance of US markets to the PRC. 
Higher duties could lead to stronger trade restriction 
effects and diversion effects. A larger market share of 
PRC exports in the US market, the weaker the restriction 
effects could be. Lastly, a larger proportion of the US 
share of global imports from the PRC’s, the weaker the 
restriction effects could be.
Invisible Trade Barriers: Trade Effects of US Antidumping Actions against the 
People’s Republic of China
(continued from page 9)
There is little doubt that US enterprises will 
continue to frequently use antidumping laws to reduce 
competition from the PRC’s exporters. The real effects 
of the US antidumping measures, however, fall short of 
their expectations. The protection effect of antidumping 
actions is quite limited. For the PRC, the results suggest 
that increasing the market share the PRC exports and 
enhancing the PRC’s market position in the US by 
legal means is one way of weakening the impacts of US 
antidumping measures against the PRC.
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In many, if not most, economies, sharp declines in 
household saving rates have been offset by sharp 
increases in corporate saving rates for the past two 
decades (see, for example, Karabarbounis and Neiman, 
2012). Furthermore, changes in cash holdings, the most 
liquid component of corporate saving, have played 
an especially important role. The existing literature 
concludes that cash remains “king,” at least for certain 
groups of firms, and that debt capacity does not provide 
the same degree of downside protection as cash does 
(Almeida et al. 2013).  
(continued on next page)
Figure 1 shows trends in changes in cash holdings 
(as a share of total assets) for 11 Asian economies during 
the 2003–2011 period, and as can be seen from this 
figure, changes in cash holdings were almost always 
positive throughout this period, which indicates that 
cash holdings increased throughout this period. This 
supports the view that there was a “saving glut” in Asia. 
However, some variations can be observed across time, 
with a slight dip in changes in cash holdings in 2008 and 
a sharper drop in 2011. 
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Despite the importance of corporate saving in 
general and changes in cash holdings in particular, 
relatively little research has been done on the 
determinants of corporate saving and changes in cash 
holdings. Our research tries to fill this gap by considering 
why firms hold cash and what determines how much 
cash firms hold, with particular attention to Asian firms.
Why Firms Hold Cash
A firm that is not financially constrained will not 
necessarily increase its cash holdings in response to an 
increase in its cash flow and may use the entire increase 
in its cash flow to finance current investment because 
it knows that it will be able to finance future investment 
using external funds without any difficulty. However, 
a firm that is financially constrained will use at least 
part of the increase in its cash flow to increase its cash 
holdings so that it will be able to increase its future 
investment without relying on external funds. Thus, an 
increase in cash flow will cause financially constrained 
firms to save more in the form of cash (that is, the “cash 
flow sensitivity of cash” of financially constrained firms 
will be positive)—the hypothesis discussed in Almeida, 
Campello, and Weisbach (2004).
Previous Empirical Studies
This hypothesis is supported by existing empirical 
studies, but the results appear to be sensitive to the 
estimation method used. For example, Almeida, 
Campello, and Weisbach (2004), using a large sample 
of US manufacturing firms for the 1971–2000 period, 
regress the increase in cash holdings on cash flow and 
other variables and finds that the coefficient of cash 
flow is statistically insignificant for unconstrained firms 
but that it is positive and statistically significant for 
financially constrained firms, regardless of what criterion 
(payout ratio, asset size, bond ratings, commercial paper 
rating, and index of firm financial constraints) is used to 
partition firms into constrained and unconstrained firms. 
Khurana, Martin, and Pereira (2006) obtain empirical 
support for the Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach 
(2004) hypothesis using firm-level data on 35 countries 
from throughout the world, while Riddick and Whited 
(2009) find, using firm-level data for Canada, France, 
Germany, Japan, and the United States, that the results 
are sensitive to the estimation method used and that the 
results based on the preferred estimation method fail to 
support the Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) 
hypothesis.
Results for Asian Firms
To the best of our knowledge, Horioka and Terada-
Hagiwara (2013) are the first to test Almeida, Campello, 
and Weisbach’s (2004) hypothesis focusing on Asian 
economies while also addressing the econometric 
issues identified by Riddick and Whited (2009). 
Moreover, they include several economies not included 
in previous studies such as the People’s Republic of 
China, Hong Kong, and Vietnam. They estimate the 
cash flow sensitivity of cash as in Almeida, Campello, 
and Weisbach (2004) using firm-level data for 11 Asian 
economies (Australia, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of 
Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, 
and the three aforementioned economies) for the 2002–
2011 period. They find that the impact of cash flow on 
the increase in cash holdings is positive and statistically 
significant and that its impact is larger and more highly 
significant in the case of smaller firms than in the case 
of larger firms in both the developed country sample 
and the developing country sample. Since smaller firms 
are more likely to be financially constrained than larger 
firms, these results suggest that Almeida, Campello, and 
Wiesbach’s (2004) theoretical analysis is applicable in 
the case of Asia as well. Moreover, these results suggest 
that Asian firms, especially smaller ones, are financially 
constrained and that they save more when their cash 
flow increases so that they will be able to finance future 
investments.
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Policy Implications
Turning to policy implications, the findings of Horioka 
and Terada-Hagiwara (2013) suggest that the saving 
and investment behavior of Asian firms is heavily 
influenced by financial constraints and that financial 
sector development would reduce the need for liquid 
saving in the form of cash holdings, especially in the 
case of smaller firms. It is important to note that the 
financial sector development to which we are referring 
here should not be limited to traditional markets such as 
debt and equity as “liquidity” is of central importance to 
efficient investment, as noted by Almeida et al. (2013). 
Recent studies have documented that the existence 
of more liquid instruments such as credit lines and 
derivatives-based hedging can add substantially to a 
firm’s liquidity. Firms that hold undrawn credit lines are 
found to hold some cash, but firms without access to 
credit lines are found to hold significantly more cash 
than the average firm. Relaxing the financial constraints 
of firms through the introduction and expansion of such 
instruments would allow firms to invest cash flows more 
efficiently in physical assets when there are profitable 
projects by reducing the need for cash holdings. This, 
in turn, would cause the saving and investment gaps of 
firms, which have been largely positive in many of the 
countries in our sample, to narrow. 
Why Do Asian Firms Hold Cash?
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•	 384–Governance and Development Outcomes 
in Asia
Kunal Sen
January 2014
The paper finds that governance has a systematic 
positive effect on development outcomes such as 
human development, gender equality, infant and 
maternal mortality, poverty, access to sanitation, 
literacy levels, and infrastructural provision, but 
that the relationship between governance and 
development could be strengthened in developing 
Asia.
Inequality in Asia and the Pacific: Trends, Drivers and Policy Implications
Edited by Ravi Kanbur, Changyong Rhee, and Juzhong Zhuang
Asia’s rapid economic growth has led to a significant reduction in extreme poverty, but has 
been accompanied by rising inequality. This book addresses three questions: What have 
been the trends of inequality in Asia and the Pacific? What are the key drivers of rising 
inequality in the region? How should Asian countries respond to the rising inequality?
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•	 385–A Factor-Augmented Vector 
Autoregression Analysis of Business Cycle 
Synchronization in East Asia and Implications 
for a Regional Currency Union
Hyeon-seung Huh, David Kim, Won Joong Kim, 
and Cyn-Young Park
January 2014
The paper assesses the potential for a monetary 
union in Asia by evaluating the progress of 
business cycle synchronization among 10 major 
East Asian countries. 
(continued on next page)
 z Developing Asia is set to benefit as further signs 
emerge of growth momentum in the advanced 
economies. The region is poised to meet the 2013 
and 2014 growth forecasts in Asian Development 
Outlook 2013 Update, though the subregional 
contributions to growth have changed. 
 z Infrastructure investments boost the outlook for 
the People’s Republic of China by 0.1 percentage 
points to 7.7% in 2013 and 7.5% in 2014. This raises 
the forecast for East Asia as a whole by the same 
magnitude, as indicators in the subregion’s other 
economies generally align with assumptions in  
the Update.
 z South Asia is on track to meet growth expectations 
of 4.7% in 2013 and 5.5% in 2014. After bottoming out 
in the first fiscal quarter, India’s economy seems to 
have recovered on the back of rebounding exports 
and higher industrial and agricultural output. 
 z Southeast Asia’s growth forecast is tempered 
by 0.1 percentage points in both 2013 and 2014. 
Typhoon damage will moderate rapid growth in the 
Philippines before major reconstruction gets under 
way, and the unfolding political turmoil in Thailand 
is expected to undermine its growth over the 
forecast horizon. 
 z Inflation forecasts in developing Asia are unchanged 
amid softer international oil prices and lower global 
food prices.
Outlook for major industrial economies
As 2013 draws to a close, the prospects for 2014 in 
the United States (US) and Japan look more upbeat, 
but recovery in the euro area may not be as strong as 
previously thought. Data on gross domestic product 
(GDP) through the third quarter suggest that the major 
industrial economies are on track to meet the 0.9% 
growth rate forecast for 2013 in Asian Development 
Outlook 2013 Update. Industrial production indicators 
in the US and further fiscal stimulus in Japan suggest 
somewhat stronger growth in 2014 than forecast in the 
Update despite softening in the euro area. Growth in the 
major industrial economies is expected to reach 1.9% in 
2014 (Table 1).
US growth momentum strengthened in the third 
quarter of 2013. GDP grew solidly at a seasonally 
adjusted annualized rate (saar) of 3.6% quarter on 
quarter, for 1.8% output expansion in the year to date. 
Investments—which saw a high jump in inventories—
accounted for much of the growth, but all other 
components contributed positively. Notably, the 
Firming industrial economies to  
support Asia’s outlook 
Supplement
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT
Outlook
December 2013
 ADB’s Regional Economic Outlook Task Force led the preparation 
of the revised outlook for this ADO Supplement. The Task Force is 
chaired by the Economics and Research Department and includes 
representatives from the Central and West Asia Department, East 
Asia Department, Pacific Department, Office of Regional Economic 
Integration, South Asia Department, and Southeast Asia Department.
Table 1  Baseline GDP growth (%)
2012 2013 2014
ADO 
2013 
Update
Revised ADO 
2013 
Update
Revised
Major industrial economiesa 1.3 0.9 0.9 1.8 1.9
United States 2.8 1.7 1.7 2.4 2.6
Euro area –0.7 –0.5 –0.5 1.2 1.0
Japan 1.4 1.9 1.7 1.4 1.6
ADO = Asian Development Outlook, GDP = gross domestic product.
a Average growth rates are weighed by GNI, Atlas method (current US dollars). 
Sources: Asian Development Bank. 2013. Asian Development Outlook 2013 Update. 
Manila; ADB estimates.
Asian Development Outlook 2013 Supplement:
Firming Industrial Economies to Support Asia’s Outlook
Developing Asia is set to benefit as further signs emerge of growth momentum in the 
advanced economies. The region is poised to meet the 2013 and 2014 growth forecasts in 
Asian Development Outlook 2013 Update, though the subregional contributions to growth 
have changed.
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•	 386–Asian Development Outlook  
Forecast Skill 
Benno Ferrarini 
February 2014 
 
This paper assesses the accuracy of Asian 
Development Outlook forecasts against actual 
outcomes for the years from 2008 to 2011 and 
against the benchmark of International Monetary 
Fund’s World Economic Outlook forecasts.
•	 387–Public–Private Service Delivery 
Arrangements and Incentive Schemes in 
Developing Asia 
Joseph J. Capuno 
February 2014 
 
PUBLICATIONS
EVENTS
March
•	 Key Indicators 2014 Workshop
10–11 March, ADB Headquarters
•	 Final Consultation Workshop and Meetings: 
Myanmar Country Diagnostic Study
11–14 March, Nay Pyi Taw and Yangon, Myanmar
•	 Eminent Speaker Forum, Former Minister Jung-
Kyung Choi “Sharing Korean Development 
Experience: From an Insider’s View”
16 March, ADB Headquarters
•	 Inception Workshop: Economic Analysis for 
Gender and Development
31 March to 01 April 2014, Seoul
April
•	 Joint UNECE/Eurostat/OECD/ESCAP/ADB 
Meeting on the Management of Statistical 
Information Systems (MSIS 2014)
14–16 April, ADB Headquarters
•	 Workshop on Urbanization in the People’s 
Republic of China and India
15–17 April, PRC
•	 ADO 2014 Dissemination
April, DMCs and North America
May
•	 ADB-IMF Joint Seminar at ADB Annual Meetings
02–05 May, Astana, Kazakhstan
•	 Launch and Dissemination: Myanmar Country 
Diagnostic Study
14 May, Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar
This paper explains the rationale for and the 
factors that account for the successes or failures 
of public-private service delivery arrangements, 
in selected case studies in developing Asian 
countries focusing on the role of monetary and 
nonmonetary incentives used.
•	 390–Vertical Specialization, Tariff Shirking, 
and Trade
Alyson C. Ma and Ari Van Assche
February 2014
Using export data from the People’s Republic 
of China, the paper demonstrates that vertical 
specialization allows firms to more easily 
circumvent antidumping measures by relocating 
their manufacturing to another country.
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